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Abstract
Cluster-based randomized experiments are popular designs for mitigating the bias
of standard estimators when interference is present and classical causal inference and
experimental design assumptions (such as SUTVA or ITR) do not hold. Without
an exact knowledge of the interference structure, it can be challenging to understand
which partitioning of the experimental units is optimal to minimize the estimation
bias. In the paper, we introduce a monotonicity condition under which a novel two-
stage experimental design allows us to determine which of two cluster-based designs
yields the least biased estimator. We then consider the setting of online advertising
auctions and show that reserve price experiments verify the monotonicity condition
and the proposed framework and methodology applies. We validate our findings on an
advertising auction dataset.
Keywords: Causal inference; Potential outcomes; Violations of SUTVA.
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1 Introduction
Randomized experiments — or A/B tests — are at the core of many product decisions at
large technology companies. Under the commonly assumed Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA), these A/B tests serve to estimate unbiasedly the effect of assigning
all units to a particular intervention over an alternative condition (Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
The SUTVA assumption is one of no interference between units: a unit’s outcome in the
experiment does not depend on the treatment assignment of any other unit.
In many A/B tests however, this assumption is not tenable. Consider an intervention
on a user of a messaging platform: the (potential) resulting change in her behavior (e.g.
increase in time spent on the platform, in number of messages sent, a decrease in response
time) would affect the friends on the platform she chooses to communicate with. The same
cascading phenomenon can also occur in more subtle ways in a social feed setting. Changes
to a feed ranking algorithm, and the resulting behavioral changes (e.g. a higher click-through
rate, feedback, or interaction time with the content on the feed) will invariably affect the
content on that unit’s friends’ social feeds (Eckles et al., 2016; Gui et al., 2015).
In particular, the same is true in an advertiser auction setting, where modifications to the
ecosystem can impact auctions and bidders not originally assigned to the intervention (Basse
et al., 2016). Suppose that one bidder changes her strategy as a result of being assigned
to a higher reserve price, or her usual bid no longer meets the reserve. The bidders she
competes with now face a different bid distribution — the auction is now more competitive
if she increases her bid to meet the new reserve, or less competitive if she fails to meet
the reserve. These bidders might react to this new bid distribution by updating their own
bidding strategy, even though they were not originally assigned to the intervention. This
effect could potentially affect the other auctions they participate in.
When SUTVA does not hold, we say there is interference between units, and many funda-
mental results of the causal inference literature no longer hold. For example, the difference-
in-means estimator under a completely randomized assignment is no longer unbiased (Imbens
and Rubin, 2015). When the estimand is the difference of outcomes under two extreme as-
signments — one assigning all units to the intervention, and the other assigning none — a
common approach to mitigating the bias of standard estimators in the face of interference is
to run cluster-based randomized designs (Ugander et al., 2013; Walker and Muchnik, 2014;
Eckles et al., 2017). These randomized designs group assign units to treatment or control in
groups to limit the amount of interaction between different treatment buckets.
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If it can be shown that there is no interaction across treatment buckets, we recover
many of the results stated under SUTVA. In practice, however, such a grouping of units
may not exist and A/B test practitioners often settle to find the best possible partitioning.
The problem is often formulated as the balanced partitioning of a weighted graph on the
experimental units, where an edge is drawn between two units that are liable to interfere with
one another. This is a challenging task, both algorithmically and empirically: clustering a
graph into balanced partitions is known to be NP-hard, even if we tolerate some unevenness
between partitions (Andreev and Racke, 2006); furthermore, the correct graph representation
of the interference mechanism is not always clear.
While the literature on finding balanced partitioning of weighted graphs and analysing
cluster-based randomized designs is extensive (Middleton and Aronow, 2011; Donner and
Klar, 2004; Eckles et al., 2017), there are relatively few prior works that tackle the follow-
ing question: can we determine which of two balanced partitionings produces less biased
estimates of the total treatment effect, without assuming the exact structure of interference
is known? The objective of this paper is to show we can in fact identify the better of two
clusterings through experimentation under an assumption on the interference mechanism,
which we call monotonicity.
Even when the exact structure of interference is not known, monotonicity can established
under a theoretical model. For example, some interference mechanisms are self-exciting —
if assigning any unit to the intervention will boost the outcomes of any neighboring units.
Examples range from vaccination campaigns to social feed ranking algorithms. In both
cases, the units in the vicinity of a unit assigned to the intervention tend to benefit over
those surrounded by units in the control bucket. Interference mechanisms that exhibit this
self-exciting property are a particular example of monotone mechanisms (cf. Section 2.2).
When monotonicity holds, we show that it is feasible to compare two balanced partitionings
of the experimental units by running a straightforward modification of an experiment-of-
experiments design (Saveski et al., 2017; Pouget-Abadie et al., 2017).
We make the following contributions: we present an experiment-of-experiments design
for comparing cluster-based randomized designs. We define a monotonicity assumption un-
der which we can determine which clustering induces the least biased estimates of the total
treatment effect using this comparative design. While our technique applies to the general
problem of experimental design under interference with a monotonicity assumption, we prove
that pricing experiments1 in the context of ad exchanges are monotone, and thus our frame-
1While pricing experiments are done in the context of ad exchanges (AdE, 2018), we note that our paper
is a theoretical study of the subject and does not include any real treatments of ad campaigns.
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work applies to this illustrative example. Finally, we report an empirical simulation study
of our algorithms for a publicly-available dataset for online ads.
In Section 2, we establish the theoretical framework by defining the monotonocity as-
sumption, describing the suggested experiment-of-experiments design, and proposing a test
for interpreting its results. In Section 3, we explain how this framework can be applied to
a real-world setting, by showing that reserve-price experiments on advertising auctions are
monotone. Finally, we validate these findings on a Yahoo! ad auction dataset in Section 4.
2 Theory
In this section, we set the notation for the estimand, estimates, and cluster-based random-
ized designs that we study. We then define the monotonicity assumption, introduce our
experiment-of-experiments design, and suggest an approach to analysing its results.
2.1 Cluster-based randomized designs
Let N be the number of experimental units, let vector Y denote the outcome metric of
interest, and let vector Z denote the assignment of units to treatment (Zi = 1) or control
(Zi = 0). Recall that under the potential outcomes framework, Y(Z) denotes the potential
outcomes of the N units under assignment Z. Under the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA), this simplifies to (Yi(Zi))
N
1 . The estimand of interest here is the
Total Treatment Effect (TTE), defined as the difference of outcomes between one assignment
assigning all units to treatment, and another assigning none:
TTE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi(Z = ~1)− Yi(Z = ~0) (1)
A completely randomized (CR) design assigns NT units chosen completely at random to
treatment and the remaining NC = N − NT units to control. A clustering C is a partition
of the N experimental units into M clusters. A cluster-based randomized (CBR) design is
a randomized assignment of units to treatment and control at the cluster level: if cluster j
is assigned to treatment (resp. control), then all units in cluster j are assigned to treatment
(resp. control). We will use the notation EZ∼C[X] to denote the expected value of estimator
X under a C-cluster-based randomized design. Recall that Z ∼ C represents the assignment
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of units to treatment and control, resulting from assigning the clusters of C uniformly at
random to treatment or control.
Let MT (resp. MC) be the number of clusters assigned to treatment (resp. control). Let
z ∈ {0, 1}M be the assignment vector over clusters, where M = MT + MC . In practice, we
will use the Horvitz-Thompson (HT) estimator, defined below:
τˆ =
M
N
 1
MT
M∑
j=1
zj
∑
i∈Cj
Yi(Z)− 1
MC
M∑
j=1
(1− zj)
∑
i∈Cj
Yi(Z)
 (2)
Under SUTVA, the HT estimator is an unbiased estimator of the total treatment effect
under any C-CBR assignment (Middleton and Aronow, 2011):
EZ∼C[τˆ ] = TTE
When SUTVA does not hold, this property is no longer guaranteed, and τˆ may be biased.
Our objective is to minimize the bias, defined below, with respect to the clustering, without
assuming any explicit knowledge of the interference mechanism or the value of the estimand
TTE:
min
C
|EZ∼C[τˆ ]− TTE| (3)
2.2 A monotonicity assumption
Choosing the partitioning of our experimental units in a way that minimizes the bias of our
estimators (cf. Eq. 3) when running a cluster-based experiment is a difficult task: without the
ground truth, we cannot observe the bias directly. However, under a specific monotonicity
property— common to many randomized experiments —the task of choosing the better of
two clusterings becomes straightforward.
Definition 1. Let P be the set of all possible clusterings of our N units. For a subset P ′ ⊂ P
of possible clusterings, we say that the interference model is P ′-increasing if and only if
∀C ∈ P ′, EZ∼C[τˆ ] ≤ τ,
and it is P ′-decreasing if and only if
∀C ∈ P ′, EZ∼C[τˆ ] ≥ τ
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A P ′-monotone model is one that is either P ′-increasing or P ′-decreasing.
A monotone model is one for which the expectation of the HT estimator τˆ is either
always a lower bound or always an upper-bound of the estimand under any C-CBR design
for C ∈ P ′. It is sufficient for P ′ to contain the partitions we wish to compare: we do
not have to prove monotonicity beyond those partitions. Before delving into examples of
monotone interference mechanisms, we introduce the following proposition, which highlights
why monotonicity is useful for reasoning about bias.
Proposition 1. If the interference model is P ′-increasing, then for all C1, C2 ∈ P ′2, it holds
that
EZ∼C1 [τˆ ] ≤ EZ∼C2 [τˆ ] =⇒ |EZ∼C1 [τˆ ]− τ | ≥ |EZ∼C2 [τˆ ]− τ |
If the interference model is P ′-decreasing, then for all C1, C2 ∈ P ′2, it holds that
EZ∼C1 [τˆ ] ≤ EZ∼C2 [τˆ ] =⇒ |EZ∼C1 [τˆ ]− τ | ≥ |EZ∼C2 [τˆ ]− τ |
Proposition 1 is a simple consequence of Definition 1: if we know that two cluster-based
estimates are both lower bounds of the estimand, then the greater of the two must be less
biased. The same reasoning applies if they both upper-bound the estimand. It is sufficient
to compare the expectation of our estimators to determine which is less biased.
The crux of our framework therefore relies on reasoning about monotonicity. Many com-
monly studied parametric models of interference are in fact monotone. Consider the following
linear model of interference (e.g. studied in (Eckles et al., 2017)):
Yi(Z) = αi + βiZi + γρi + i, (4)
where for all i, (αi, βi, γ) ∈ R3, i ∼ N (0, 1) is independent of ρi, and ρi = 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni Zj is
the proportion of i’s neighborhood Ni that is treated. This expresses each unit’s outcome
as a linear function of a fixed effect, a heterogeneous treatment effect, and a network effect
proportional to the fraction of my neighborhood that is treated. As shown in the following
proposition, this is monotone.
Proposition 2. For all C ∈ P, let θC = 1N
∑
i
|Ni∩C(i)|
|Ni| be the average proportion of a unit i’s
neighborhood Ni included in its assigned cluster C(i). Then,
τ − EZ∼C[τˆ ] = γM
M − 1(1− θC)
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It follows that if γ ≥ 0, the interference model is P-increasing, otherwise it is P-decreasing.
We can also extend the above for heterogeneous network effect parameters γi. A proof
can be found in Section A.
Proposition 3. Let θC,i =
|Ni∩C(i)|
|Ni| . For all C ∈ P,
τ − EZ∼C[τˆ ] = M
N(M − 1)
∑
i
γi(1− θC,i)
It follows that if
∑
i γi(1− θi) ≥ 0, then the interference model is P-increasing, otherwise it
is P-decreasing.
It follows that if γi ≥ 0,∀i, then the interference mechanism is P-increasing, and if
γi ≤ 0, ∀i, then it is P-decreasing. If the sign of γi is not consistent, then the monotonicity
depends on the clustering: if all units with a given sign are perfectly clustered (θC,i = 1),
e.g. all units with γi ≥ 0, then the mechanism is once again monotone.
More sophisticated interference mechanisms, without an immediate parametric form, are
also monotone. For example, we show that the interference mechanism present in reserve
price experiments in an advertiser auction setting is monotone (under certain conditions).
See Section 3 for more details. For these complex interference mechanisms, it can also be
easier to establish the following sufficient (but not necessary) condition:
Proposition 4. We say an interference mechanism verifies the self-excitation property for
a set of partitions P ′, if for all units i and partitions C ∈ P ′,
EZ∼C[Yi(Z) : Zi = 0] ≥ Yi(~0)
EZ∼C[Yi(Z) : Zi = 1] ≤ Yi(~1)
A P ′-self-exciting process is P ′-increasing. A self-deexciting mechanism, with flipped in-
equalities, is P ′-decreasing.
The proof is included in Section A. The two inequalities capture the following phe-
nomenon: conditioned on my treatment status, if my outcome is greatest when my neighbor-
hood is entirely in treatment, and lowest when my neighborhood is entirely in control, then
an experiment always under-estimates the true treatment effect. This only needs to be true
in expectation over the assignments Z, even if, in practice, we can show that the inequalities
hold for all Z (cf. Section 3).
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C1 C2
Treatment
(Z = 1)
Control
(Z = 0)
Arm 1
(W = 1)
Arm 2
(W = 0)
Treatment
(Z = 1)
Control
(Z = 0)
CR
Figure 1: A hierarchical experimental design, which assigns the experimental units to one of
two cluster-based randomized designs, C1 and C2, completely at random (CR). τˆ
W
1 and τˆ
W
2
represent the treatment effect estimates under each design respectively.
We say the interference mechanism is self-exciting because these inequalities are verified
when units benefit from being surrounded by units in treatment. A successful messaging
feature launch is a straightforward example of a self-exciting process, as is any pricing mech-
anism that penalizes any treated bidders and boosts the utility of their competitors.
2.3 An experiment-of-experiments design
Under monotonicity, Proposition 1 states that we can determine the least-biased of two
P-increasing or P-decreasing cluster-based designs, without knowledge of the estimand, by
comparing the expectation of their estimates. However, only one cluster-based design can
ever be applied to the set of experimental units in its entirety, and the comparison of EZ∼C1 [τˆ ]
with EZ∼C2 [τˆ ] cannot be done directly.
This resembles the fundamental problem of causal inference, which states that units can-
not be placed both in treatment and control buckets, and is solved through randomization.
Inspired by (Saveski et al., 2017; Pouget-Abadie et al., 2017), we suggest to randomly assign
different units to either clustering algorithm, resulting in a 2-step hierarchical randomized
design. The procedure, described in pseudo-code in Algorithm 1, is as follows:
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• Assign units completely at random to two design buckets, one for each clustering
algorithm. Let W ∈ {1, 2}N be the vector representing that assignment.
• Within each design bucket, cluster the remaining units together according to the ap-
propriate partition: if Wi = Wj = k and Ck(i) = Ck(j), then i and j belong to the
same cluster in design bucket k ∈ {1, 2}. The resulting partitions are CW1 and CW2 .
• Within each design bucket, assign the resulting clusters to treatment and control. Let
Z be the resulting assignment vector. This is possible because no unit belongs to both
CW1 and CW2 .
Algorithm 1: Experiment of experiments design
Input: Partitions C1, C2 of the N units into M1, M2 clusters.
Output: Z ∈ {0, 1}N encoding the assignment of each unit to a treatment or control
bucket.
Choose W ∈ {1, 2}N uniformly at random, encoding the assignment of units to design
arms 1 and 2;
for k ∈ {1, 2} do
Let CWk be the clustering on {i ∈ [1, N ] : Wi = k} such that
CWk (i) = C
W
k (j) iff Ck(i) = Ck(j);
Assign units in treatment arm k to treatment and control with a CWk -cluster-based
design;
end
return the resulting assignment vector Z;
Algorithm 1 provides us with two estimates, τˆW1 and τˆ
W
2 , of the causal effect, one from
each design arm. The resulting clusterings CW1 and CW2 may be unbalanced. This is of minor
importance as the HT estimator (cf. Eq. 2) is unbiased (under SUTVA) for unbalanced
clusterings, and balancedness is required only to control its variance. In practice, C1 and C2
are not required to have the same number of clusters, but we expect the clusters sizes to be
large enough for each cluster to have at least one unit in each design arm after the first stage
with high probability.
From the comparison of τˆW1 and τˆ
W
2 , we seek to order EZ∼C1 [τˆ1] and EZ∼C2 [τˆ2]. Under
arbitrary interference structures, these proxy estimates are not guaranteed to have the same
ordering, the key condition for Proposition 1. Intuitively, τˆW1 and τˆ
W
2 represent the treatment
effect estimates for two “weakened” versions of each partitioning C1 and C2. This is where a
completely randomized assignment helps. Because the assignment of units to design arms is
done completely at random, it affects each partitioning in the same way, and we expect the
ordering to stay the same. For the linear model of interference in Prop. 3, we have:
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Property 1. An interference mechanism is said to be P ′-transitive if ∀(C1, C2) ∈ P ′2,
EW,Z∼CW1
[
τˆW1
] ≤ EW,Z∼CW2 [τˆW2 ]⇔ EZ∼C1 [τˆ ] ≤ EZ∼C2 [τˆ ]
As a sanity check, we can also confirm that the property holds for SUTVA. The property
can also be shown for the linear interference mechanisms introduced in Prop. 3:
Proposition 5. Under SUTVA, it holds that
EW,Z∼CWk
[
τˆWk
]
= EZ∼Ck [τˆ ] = τ.
Hence, the no-interference case is trivially P-transitive. Furthermore, the linear model of
interference in Prop. 3 is P-transitive if the same number of units is assigned to each design
arm:
∑
[Wi = 1] =
N
2
.
A full proof can be found in Section A. For more complex mechanisms of interference, as
is the case for reserve price experiments, we use simulations to confirm the intuition that
transitivity holds. See Section 4 for more details.
As is common with A/B tests, we do not have access to the expectation of our estimators,
and rely on approximations to the variance, such as Neymann’s variance estimator. In order
to meaningfully compare the estimates we obtain, we must apply our method of choice to
determine when their ordering is significant. For example, we can make a normal approx-
imation to the distribution of the estimates— using Neymann’s estimator to upper-bound
the variance —to estimate the probability that one estimate is greater than the other with
a certain significance level:
Proposition 6. For k ∈ {1, 2}, recall the definition of the Neymannian variance estimator
for cluster-based randomized designs:
σˆWk =
Mk
Nk
(
Sˆk,t
Mk,t
+
Sˆk,c
Mk,c
)
, (5)
where Mk (resp. Nk) is the number of clusters (resp. units) in CWk , Sˆk,t = var{Y ′j,k : zj =
1} and Sˆk,c = var{Y ′j,k : zj = 0}, and Y ′j,k =
∑
CWk (i)=j Yi. Assume that the interference
mechanism is transitive and P ′-increasing, such that (C1, C2) ∈ P ′2. If α is the level of
significance chosen, we state that C1 is a significantly better clustering than C2 if and only if
Φ
(
τˆW1 − τˆW2√
σˆW1 + σˆ
W
2
)
< α,
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where Φ is the cdf of the normal distribution.
A similar reasoning applies to P ′-decreasing mechanisms. If the Gaussian approximation
is not appropriate, the distribution of the estimators can equally be approximated by a
bootstrap analysis, or a more sophisticated model-based imputation method (Imbens and
Rubin, 2015). More details can be found in Section A.
3 Application to reserve price experiments
Online advertising exchanges provide an interface for bidders to participate in a set of auc-
tions for advertising online. These ads can appear within the company’s own content, in
a social feed, below a search query, or on the webpage of an affiliated publisher. These
auctions provide the vast majority of revenue to these platforms, and are thus the subject of
experimentation and optimization. Platforms run experiments and monitor different metrics
including of revenue and estimates of bidders’ welfare. One such welfare metric is the sum
of the bids of advertisers, and another metric is the sum of estimated utility of bidders via
another utility estimator.
One possible parameter subject to optimization is the method of determining reserve
prices. Online marketplaces can choose to implement a reserve price, which sets the minimum
bid required for a bid to be valid and compete with others. It may vary from bidder to bidder,
and from auction to auction. A higher reserve may improve revenue, but if it is too high,
then too many bids are discarded and ad opportunities can go unsold.
Modifications to a reserve price rule are prime examples of experiments where SUTVA
does not hold. A change in reserve price to one bidder affects the bidding problem facing
another bidder, even when her reserve is unchanged (e.g., reducing competition when the
reserve to the first bidder is higher). Although we ignore them here, budget constraints
are another factor— if a budget-constrained bidder faces higher reserve prices, then she may
adjust her bids to re-optimize return on investment. Working without budget constraints, we
establish conditions under which the resulting interference mechanism within reserve price
experiments is monotone, both in the case of a single-item second price auction setting and
in the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction setting for positional ads. See (Varian and Harris,
2014) for a reference.
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3.1 Single-item second price auctions
We consider a single-item second-price auction with N bidders B = {Bi}i∈N : the highest
bidder wins the auction and is charged the maximum of her reserve price and the second-
highest bid. The second price auction is truthful (bidding true values is a dominant-strategy
equilibrium), and we will assume that the bidders are rational.
Consider two reserve price mechanisms (ri)i∈B (control) and (r
′
i)i∈B (treatment). Suppose
that the reserve price mechanism corresponding to treatment always sets a higher reserve
price than the reserve price mechanism corresponding to control: ∀i, r′i > ri. By symme-
try, the following argumentation would also work if the treatment and control labels were
switched.
We suppose the bidders have unobserved values (vi) for winning the auction. We randomly
assign bidders to either the treatment or control reserve price mechanism, with Z the resulting
assignment. The chosen metric of interest is a bidder’s utility, denoted by Yi(Z). For a
second-price auction, Yi = 0 if bidder i does not win the auction, and Yi = vi − p when
she wins the auction and pays price p. The bidder welfare of an auction is the sum of each
bidder’s utility,
∑
i Yi(Z), and the estimand is given by:
S =
∑
i
Yi(~1)−
∑
i
Yi(~0)
Tthe reserve price experiment for second price auctions verifies the self-excitation property
(cf. Prop. 4). The idea is that assigning a unit to the intervention can only make them less
competitive by discarding their bid from the auction. Thus, the higher the number of treated
units, the lower the competition for the remaining bidders, and the higher their utility.
Theorem 1. Consider a set of rational agents with no budget-constraints. Let the outcome
of interest be each agent’s welfare. The interference mechanism of a reserve price experiment,
assigning treated units to a higher personalized reserve price, for a single-item second-price
auction is self-exciting, and thus monotone.
Proof. Consider bidder i’s outcome under Z = ~0 and under any assignment Z′ such that
Zi = 0. There are three possible cases:
• Bidder i wins the auction in neither assignment. Her utility is therefore constant.
• Bidder i wins the auction in only one assignment. It must be that bidder i wins under
Z′ but not Z. Her utility is 0 under Z and greater than 0 under Z′.
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Figure 2: The average click-through rate (CTR) observed in the Yahoo! Search Auction
dataset, described in Section 4, can be observed to be an approximately decreasing and
convex function of the slot rank. The confidence intervals were too small to be meaningfully
reported in the figure.
• Bidder i wins the auction under both assignments. If the second highest bid is the
same under both assignments, bidder i’s utility is constant. Otherwise, the second
highest bid under Z′ can only be lower than the second highest bid under Z. Thus
bidder i’s payment is lower and her utility is higher under assignment Z′ than under
assignment Z.
By symmetry, we reach a similar conclusion when comparing assignments Z = ~1 and any
assignment Z′ such that Z ′i = 1.
It follows that the reserve price experiment is P-increasing, and any cluster-based ran-
domized design underestimates the bidder welfare estimand.
3.2 Positional ad auctions
In practice, ad auctions are also multi-item, used for selling more than one ad position on
a user’s view. We now extend the previous results to a multi-item setting, with m items
(or “slots”). We assume the common positional ad setting, where each slot has an inherent
click-through rate posj, which we can suppose is ordered: pos1 > pos2 > · · · > posm (Varian,
2007). Each bidder i is only ever allocated at most one item, with value vi for getting a
click. As a result, bidder i’s utility for winning slot j is vi · posj− pi, where pi is the required
12
payment. We assume for simplicity that all bidders have the same ad quality, and thus the
same click-through rate for a given ad slot.
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction takes place in two parts. First, a value-
maximising allocation is chosen (based on bids). Here, the highest bids win the highest
slots. Bidders are then charged the externality they impose on all other bidders. In other
words, assuming that bidder k obtains the kth slot, bidder k pays:
pk =
m∑
j=k+1
(posj−1 − posj) · vj · 1[vj≥rj ]
where rj is the reserve imposed on bidder j with value vj. We can prove that the self-
excitation property holds under a convexity assumption.
Theorem 2. Consider a set of rational agents with no budget-constraints. Let the outcome of
interest be each agent’s welfare. The interference mechanism of a reserve price experiment,
assigning treated units to a higher personalized reserve price, for a VCG auction in the
positional ad setting with no quality effects is self-exciting, and thus monotone if the click-
through rate function pos : i 7→ posi is convex:
∀i > j, posi+1 − posi ≤ posj+1 − posj,
This convexity assumption is verified empirically in the literature and in the Yahoo!
auction dataset2 introduced in Section 4 (cf. Figure 2). The intuition behind the proof is
similar: the greater the number of my competitors are treated, the fewer are able to compete,
and thus the higher my utility. We prove this through a case analysis. Let rZk be the reserve
that bidder k faces under assignment vector Z: rZk = rk if Zk = 0 and r
′
k otherwise.
Proof. Consider the outcomes of bidder i and j under Z and Z′ such that for all k 6= j,
Zk = Z
′
k, Zi = Z
′
i = 0, and Zj = 0 < Z
′
j = 1. By transitivity, if we can show Yi(Z) ≤ Yi(Z ′),
then it follows that Yi(~0) ≤ EC[Yi(Z) : Zi = 0]. There are three possible cases:
• The allocation of bidders to slots does not change and thus prices do not change.
Bidder i’s utility is constant.
• Bidder i is allocated to slot i for both Z and Z′ assignments, but bidder j’s (j < i)
2Our own dataset could potentially suffer from endogeneity, where weaker bidders are consistently assigned
to lower slots. The assumption is, however, supported elsewhere in the literature (Brooks, 2004; Richardson
et al., 2007).
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bid is discarded when j is treated (Z ′): r′j > vj > rj. The difference of bidder i’s
outcome under the two treatment assignments is: Yi(Z) − Yi(Z′) = −
∑
k≥j(posk−1 −
posk)(vk1vk>rZk − vk+11vk+1>rZk+1). This quantity is always negative, hence Yi(Z) ≤
Yi(Z
′).
• Bidder j’s (j < i) bid is discarded when j is treated and thus bidder i is allo-
cated to slot i − 1. In that case, bidder i’s utility under Z is: Yi(Z) = posivi −∑
k≥i+1(posk−1 − posk)vk1vk>rZk . The same bidder i′s utility under Z′ is: Yi(Z′) =
posi−1vi −
∑
k≥i+1(posk−2 − posk)vk1vk>rZk .
It follows that the difference of bidder i’s outcomes is equal to:
Yi(Z)− Yi(Z′) = (posi − posi−1)vi
−
∑
k≥i+1
(posk−2 + posk − 2posk−1)vk,
where the 1vk>rZk terms are implicit. Note that each individual term of the sum is
positive by convexity, such that Yi(Z) ≤ Yi(Z′).
4 Experimental Data and Validation
In this section, we validate our design strategy for comparing two given graph partitions for
the purpose of experimentation under interference to an advertising auction dataset. For
this purpose, we make use of a Yahoo! auction dataset.
4.1 The Yahoo! Search Auction dataset
The Yahoo! Search Marketing Advertiser Bid-Impression-Click data on competing Keywords
dataset is a publicly-available dataset released by Yahoo!3, containing bid, impression, click,
and revenue data between advertiser-keyphrase pairs over a period of 4 months. The adver-
tiser and keyphrase are anonymized, represented as a randomly-chosen string. A sample line
of the dataset is reproduced4 below:
3Available for download at https://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com/
4The account ID and keyword ID’s have been shortened for the sake of exposition in this sample line.
The bid value is given in 1/100¢.
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Per keyphrase
nbr of bids min 1
median 2
max 7041
bid value min .3¢
median 66¢
max $320
impressions min 1
median 3
max 5 · 106
clicks min 0
cdf(1) 91.4
max 7041
Per bidder
nbr of bids min 1
median 9
max 2.1 · 104
bid value min .5¢
median 60¢
max $4700
impressions min 1
median 31
max 1.4 · 106
clicks min 0
cdf(1) 93.3
max 1.1 · 104
Table 1: Summary statistics for the Yahoo! dataset, aggregated by keyphrase or by bidder,
per day for the entire 4 month period. Bid values are given in USD unless specified other-
wise. cdf(1) is the value of the cumulative distribution function of impressions for a single
impression.
day id rank keyphrase bid impress. clicks
1 a3d2 2 f3e4,j6r3,. . . 100.0 1.0 0.0
Table 2: Sample line in the Yahoo! dataset
The dataset contains 77, 850, 272 bidding activities of 16, 268 different bidders. There are
a total of 75, 359 keywords represented, for a total of unique 648, 515 keyphrases (or list of
keywords). Table 1 contains a series of summary statistics computed over keyphrase-day
pairs and bidder-day pairs, namely the total number of bids, the total bid value, the total
number of impressions, and the total number of clicks per keyword (or per bidder) and per
day.
We can represent the Yahoo! dataset by a set of bipartite graphs between bidders,
identified by their account id, and the keyphrases. The bid bipartite graph on day t draws
a weighted edge of weight wij between every bidder-keyphrase pair such that bidder i bids
wij on keyphrase j on day t. We can aggregate these graphs over the entire time period
(4 months) by summing their edge weights together. We can also consider the impression,
rank, and clicks graphs, where the weight of the edge is given by the number of impressions,
the rank, or the number of clicks respectively received by bidder i on keyphrase j.
The dataset only provides data aggregated at the granularity of a single day, reporting
the average bid and total number of impressions and clicks for each bidder, keyphrase day
triplet. Hence, we define a keyphrase-day pair as a single auction, where each bidder’s bid
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Figure 3: Weighted ratio of edges across partitions for successive runs of the R-LDG algo-
rithm on the weighted bid graph into 50 partitions and 400 partitions respectively.
is set to the reported average bid for that keyphrase-day pair. For the sake of simplicity, we
will only consider a setting with the first 4 ad positions, which account for the majority of
clicks.
4.2 Simulating a reserve price experiment
While the Yahoo! Search Auction dataset provides us with a set of bidders, keyphrases,
and the bids, impressions, and clicks that link them, it does not provide us with an actual
intervention on the auction ecosystem. We must therefore simulate the impact of a change
in the reserve price given to each bidder.
While many possible units of randomization exist for an auction experiment (keyphrases,
bidders, browsers, users, various pairings of these units, etc.), the reserve price experiment we
consider randomizes on bidders. On large auction platforms, the reserve price might be set
through the application of machine learning methods. In our context, we choose a random
non-zero reserve price for each bidder, calibrating the spread of the distribution such that
some bidders will not always be able to match the reserve price for all auctions. All bidders
assigned to the intervention will face their non-zero reserve price, fixed for every auction for
simplicity. All bidders assigned to the control bucket will not face a reserve price.
Within the same auction for a given keyphrase, two participating bidders may face distinct
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reserves and be assigned to different treatment buckets. A bidder-cluster-based randomized
experiment is thus used to mitigate the possible interference between bidders, our units of
randomization, within a single auction.
To validate our experiment-of-experiments design, we must find candidate balanced graph
partitions to compare, a problem known to be NP-hard — even when we slightly relax the
balancedness assumption (Andreev and Racke, 2006). In the last several years, there has
been good progress in developing scalable distributed balanced partitioning algorithms for
graphs with billions of edges (Tsourakakis et al., 2014; Aydin et al., 2016). These algorithms
have enabled practitioners to apply these large-scale graph mining algorithms for large-
scale randomized experimental studies (Ugander and Backstrom, 2013; Saveski et al., 2017;
Rolnick et al., 2016). Of the numerous heuristic algorithms for finding such partitions,
the Restreaming Linear Deterministic Greedy (R-LDG) algorithm (Nishimura and Ugander,
2013) is a popular choice. It consists of repeatedly applying a greedy algorithm, originally
proposed in (Stanton and Kliot, 2012), which assigns each node u to one of k partitions
according to the following objective:
arg max
i∈{1,...k}
|P ti ∩N(u)|
(
1− |P
t
i |
Hi
)
where P ti is the set of nodes assigned to partition i at step t of the algorithm, Hi is the
maximum capacity of partition i ∈ {1, . . . k}, and N(u) is the set of neigbhors of node u in
the graph.
We can apply this clustering algorithm to any of the bipartite graphs introduced in Sec-
tion 4.2, aggregated over the entire time period, resulting in a set of mixed bidder-keyphrase
clusters. The bidder-only clusters are obtained from the previous clustering by simpling re-
moving the keyphrase nodes from consideration. The algorithm’s objective must be slightly
modifed to accomodate weighted graphs, by replacing |P ti ∩N(u)| with
∑
i,j wij1i∈N(u)1j∈P ti .
Furthermore, we must also modify the balance requirement, since only the bidder side of
the bipartite graph clustering is required to be balanced! We therefore replace (1− |P ti |/Hi)
with
(
1− |P ti,c|/Hi,c
)
where P ti,c is the set of bidder nodes in partition P
t
i and Hi,c is the
maximum number of allowed bidder nodes in partition P ti . The final objective is given by:
arg max
i∈{1,...k}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N(u),j∈P ti
wij
∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
1− |P
t
i,c|
Hi,c
)
Figure 3 plots the proportion of edges cut, weighted by the bid amount, over consecutive
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runs of the R-LDG algorithm for 50 and 100 clusters. We adopt three main vectors of com-
parison between candidates partitions to determine the efficacy of our proposed experiment-
of-experiment design:
• Quality: comparing partitions of the graph that differ in their estimated quality, for
example by looking at the number of edges cut, for a fixed number of clusters. As
an extreme example, we will compare a random graph partitioning to a partitioning
obtained by running the R-LDG algorithm to convergence.
• Number of partitions: comparing two partitions of the graph obtained by running the
same clustering algorithm for a different number of partitions. As an example, we
will consider a R-LDG clustering with 10 clusters and a R-LDG clustering with 400
clusters.
• Metric: comparing partitions of the graph that are obtained by applying the same
algorithm on different bipartite graphs. As an example, we will compare a R-LDG
clustering of the bid graph with an R-LDG clustering of the impressions graph.
The dataset does not provide the budgets of the bidders or their perceived ad quality,
hence we will adopt the same simplifying assumptions as Section 3 of no quality effects
between bidders and no budget constraints. Furthermore, we assume bids are unchanged as
a result of the experiment (which would be valid for rational, non budget-limited bidders).
4.3 Validating the empirical optimization
We first compare a partitioning of the graph obtained by running the modified R-LDG
algorithm (cf. Section 4.2) against a completely random balanced partitioning of the graph.
We fix a subset of auctions with few bidders per auction, in order to showcase the framework
and establish the monotonicity and transitivity properties by allowing a setting for which
there is a clear difference between the two clusterings. The reduction in cut size — measured
by the ratio of the weighted sum of edges inter-clusters over the sum of all edge weights — over
the iterations of the algorithm is shown in Figure 3. While the weighted cut of the graph
for a random partition is around 98%, the partition obtained with the R-LDG algorithm
approaches 66% within a few iterations.
We validate the monotonicity assumption, as well as the transitivity assumption, for
reserve price experiments. In Figure 4 (a), we plot four distributions as well as the Total
18
16 15 14 13 12 11
Expected Treatment Effect
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
2.00
D
en
si
ty
 (b
oo
ts
tra
p)
C1: RLDG
C2 : random
CW1
CW2
Estimand
17 16 15 14 13 12 11
Expected Treatment Effect
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
1.50
1.75
D
en
si
ty
 (b
oo
ts
tra
p)
C1: 10
C2 : 400
CW1
CW2
Estimand
15 14 13 12 11 10
Expected Treatment Effect
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
D
en
si
ty
 (b
oo
ts
tra
p)
C1 : bids
C2 : impressions
CW1
CW2
Estimand
Figure 4: Distribution of the expectation of the HT estimator under C1 and C2, and the
induced clusterings CW1 and CW2 . The red segment represents the total treatment effect
estimand. (Top) C1 is a R-LDG clustering, C2 is a random clustering (M1 = M2 = 50).
(Middle) C1 is a R-LDG clustering into 10 partitions, C2 is a R-LDG clustering into 400
partitions. (Bottom) C1 is a R-LDG clustering of the bid graph, whereas C2 is a R-LDG
clustering of the impressions graph. (M1 = M2 = 50)
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Treatment Effect estimand (cf. Eq. 1), obtained by taking the difference between assigning
all units to a higher reserve price and assigning none. Namely, we plot the distribution of the
HT estimator’s expectation (cf. Eq 2) under each cluster-based design: EZ∼Ck [τˆ ] where k = 1
for the R-LDG clustering and k = 2 for the random clustering. We also plot the distribution
of the expectation of the experiment-of-experiments (EoE) estimators: EW,Z∼CWk [τˆ
W
k ].
We find that they all under-estimate the true treatment effect, as expected from the P-
increasing property. As expected, the HT estimator is more biased under a random clustering
than under the R-LDG clustering. Furthermore, we find that the property of transitivity
holds (cf. Eq. 1), namely the EoE estimate of the “random estimator” also under-estimates
the total treatment effect more severely than the EoE estimate of the “R-LDG estimator”.
We repeat the experiment to compare a R-LDG clustering with 10 partitions with another
R-LDG clustering with 400 partitions (cf. Figure 4 (b)). We find that the clustering with
10 partitions is less biased but exhibits higher variance, and that the transitivity property
holds. Finally, in Figure 4 (c), we compare a clustering of the impressions bipartite graph
with a clustering of the bid bipartite graph. The transitivity property is again verified, and
moreover we see that clustering the bid bipartite graph may be a better heuristic in this
setting, but the difference in the two clusterings is very slight. The code is available for
download at https://jean.pouget-abadie.com/kdd2018code.
5 Discussion
We showed that, under a certain monotonicity assumption, we can determine which of two
clusterings yields the least biased estimator by running an experiment-of-experiments design.
We noted that commonly-studied parametric models of interference verify this monotonicity
assumption. Moreover, we proved that the interference mechanism resulting from the impact
of a reserve price experiment on social utility is monotone, and hence our framework applies.
Finally, we validated our framework on a simulated reserve price experiment, grounded in a
publicly-available Yahoo! search ad dataset. There are several questions worth investigat-
ing that we did not tackle in this paper. Notably, while we explored the case of rational
bidders participating in positional ad auctions without budget constraints or quality effects
to establish monotonicity, can these assumptions be relaxed or generalized? What other
kinds of experiments are monotone (or self-exciting)? Is it possible to generalize Theorem 2
to other Vickrey-Clacke-Groves auctions, Generalized Second Price auctions, or budgeted
bidders? Finally, can the monotonicity assumption be validated empirically, either through
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an experimental design or an observational data study? It seems randomized saturation de-
signs (Baird et al.) would be a good place to start for testing monotonicity experimentally.
Finally, our framework relied on the transitivity of the experiment-of-experiment estimators:
namely, that they conserved the ordering of the expectation of the estimators under each
clustering. Whilst we validated this assumption either theoretically (cf. Prop. 5) or through
simulation (cf. Section. 4.3), can we characterize the clustering-experiment pairs that are
transitive and can the assumption be tested empirically?
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
Assume that ∀Z, Yi(Z) = αi + βi ·Zi + γi 1|Ni|
∑
j∈Ni Zj + i, where i ∼ N (0, σ2). Recall the
definition of the estimand: τ = 1
N
∑
i Yi(
~1) − Yi(~0). Plugging in the expression for Yi(~Z),
we obtain: τ = 1
N
∑
i βi +
1
N
∑
i γi. The estimator is given by: τˆ =
M
N
∑
i
(−1)1−Zi
m
Zi
t m
(1−Zi)
c
Yi(Z),
where mt (resp. mc) is the number of clusters in treatment (resp. control). Plugging in the
expression for Yi(~Z), we obtain:
EZ∼C[τˆ ] =
1
N
∑
i
βi +
1
N
∑
i
γi
( |Ni ∩ C(i)|
|Ni| −
1
M − 1
|Ni\C(i)|
|Ni|
)
We obtain the desired result by taking the difference between these quantities. Prop. 2
follows by substituting γi = γ.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4
The proposition can be established by rewritting the definition of P-increasing interference
mechanisms,
τ − EZ∼C[τˆ ] = 1
N
∑
i
(
Yi(~1)− EZ∼C[Yi(Z)|zC(i) = 1]
)
+
(
EZ∼C[Yi(Z)|zC(i) = 0]− Yi(~0)
)
,
such that a sufficient condition of the model to be P-increasing is for Yi(~1) > EZ∼C[Yi(Z)|zC(i) =
1] and Yi(~0) < EZ∼C[Yi(Z)|zC(i) = 0]. If increasing the number of treated units in that unit’s
neighborhood increases that unit’s outcome — holding that unit’s treatment assignment
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constant — then the two previous inequalities hold.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Recall that for k ∈ {1, 2}, our estimator can be written as:
τˆWk =
Mk
Nk
∑
i
WiYi(Z)
(−1)1−Zi
MZik,tM
1−Zi
k,c
,
where Mk,t (resp. Mk,c) is the number of treated (resp. control) clusters in design arm k
and Nk is the number of units in design arm k. We begin by first considering the no-
interference case. We have that EZ∼CWk [τˆk|W] = 1Nk
∑
iWi(Yi(1) − Yi(0)). By the law of
iterated expectations, we have EW,Z∼CWk [τˆ
W
k ] = τ .
We now consider the linear model suggested in Eq. 4, where we assume heterogeneous
network effects (γi). From the proof of Proposition 3, we have that
EZ∼CWk [τˆ
W
k |W] = β¯ +
Mk
Mk − 1
1
Nk
∑
i
Wiγi
(
θCWk ,i − 1
)
Note that we have EW[WiθCWk ,i] =
Nk(Nk−1)
N(N−1) θCk,i. It follows that, if M1 >> 1, M2 >> 1, and
N1 = N2 =
N
2
,
EW,Z∼CW1 [τˆ
W
1 ]− EW,Z∼CW2 [τˆW2 ] ≈
1
2N
∑
i
γiθi
≈ EZ∼C1 [τˆ ]− EZ∼C2 [τˆ ]
We conclude that the linear model of interference is transitive.
A.4 Discussion for Proposition 6
Under unspecified models of interference, theoretical bounds on the power of even the sim-
plest randomized experiment are hard to come by. While the joint assumption of mono-
tonicity and transitivity allow us to design a sensible test for detecting the better of two
partitions, they are not sufficient to bound its power without stronger assumptions. We thus
rely on simulations, like the ones run in Section 4, or theoretical approximations, like the
ones suggested in Prop. 6. It approximates EW,Z[τˆWk ], for k ∈ {1, 2} by two independently-
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distributed Gaussian variables of mean τˆWk and variance σˆ
W
k , given in Eq. 5. Their difference
therefore has the distribution N (τˆW1 − τˆW2 , σˆW1 + σˆW2 ). Recall that Neymann’s variance es-
timator is an upper-bound of the true variance, under SUTVA, in expectation over the
assignment Z (cf. (Imbens and Rubin, 2015)). We prove in the lemma below that this still
holds true for a hierarchical assignment.
Lemma 1. Under SUTVA, Neymann’s variance estimator is an upper-bound in expectation
of the true variance of the HT estimator:
EW,Z[σˆWk ] ≥ varW,Z[τˆWk ]
Proof. By Eve’s law, varW,Z[τˆ
W
k ] = EW[varZ∼CWk [
ˆτWk |W]] + varW[EZ∼CWk [τˆWk ]]. From (Im-
bens and Rubin, 2015), the first term can is equal to:
Mk
Nk
(
var(Y ′(1))
Mk,t
+
var(Y ′(0))
Mk,c
− var(Y
′(1)− Y ′(0))
Mk
)
,
where Y ′j (Z) =
∑
i∈CWk (j) Yi(Z), the cluster-level outcomes. The second term can be shown
to be equal to var(Y (1)−Y (0))
N
.
Since EW,Z[σˆ2k] =
Mk
Nk
(
var(Y ′(1))
Mk,t
+ var(Y
′(0))
Mk,c
)
, we must prove: var(Y
′(1)−Y ′(0))
Nk
≥ var(Y (1)−Y (0))
N
.
This follows from an application of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality for balanced clusters:∑
j (
∑
i Yi)
2 ≤ ∑j |Cj|∑i Y 2i , where Cj are the cluster sizes, equal to NNk in the balanced
case.
In order to determine the greater of two clusterings, we can perform two one-sided t-tests.
The Bayesian approach is to compute the posterior distribution of the difference of the two
estimates, using a conjugate Gaussian prior. In order to assess the impact of assuming
the two estimates are independent Gaussians, we suggest running a sensitivity analysis, by
considering the result of the test for different values of the correlation coefficient.
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